Ignacio De Ribera-Martin

 

New Light on the Notion of entelecheia: Two Ways of Having Soul in

the Generation of Animals

 

 

Abstract

The philosophical relevance of Aristotle’s distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, which is unique to the Generation of Animals, has not been properly appreciated. In this paper, I show how this distinction is important in two ways. First, only the mode of having soul in dunamis is adequate to articulate the peculiar way in which embryos have the soul-principle. Second, this distinction also casts light on Aristotle’s coinage of the word entelecheia: since there is more than one way of having a principle, it is fitting to coin a word to capture the complete mode of having a principle.

 

Keywords

Aristotle, Dunamis, Entelecheia,

Energeia, Soul, Embryo, Generation

 

Author

Ignacio De Ribera-Martin

The Catholic University of America

deriberamartin@cua.edu

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

Aristotle uses the notions of potentiality or capacity (δύναμις), as well as those of fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) and activity (ἐνέργεια),[1] to articulate various modes of being and to contrast them with one another.[2] For example, he says that the soul is an entelecheia of the first kind,[3] that motion is an incomplete energeia,[4] and that bronze – rather than earth – is already a statue in dunamis.[5] By means of these notions, Aristotle can describe a wide range of modes of being in the natural world, which include not only subjects (e.g., a statue, an animal, a seed), but also their activities (e.g., generation, sensation) and their principles (e.g., soul, powers).

The literature on Aristotle’s account of modes of being has focused on key passages from De an. II 1 and II 5, Phys. III 1-2, Nic. Eth. X 4, and Metaph. IX.[6] However, in these discussions no attention has been paid to the distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals (GA), a distinction that is unique to this treatise.[7] While this distinction has not gone unnoticed by commentators interested in Aristotle’s biology,[8] its relevance for the particular mode of being of the soul principle of a developing[9] animal embryo (from now on, I will refer to it simply as embryo) has not been recognized.[10]

In this paper, I will show how we need the GA distinction to describe the mode of being of the soul of an embryo. Embryos have soul, but not in the same way in which a fully generated animal has soul. The more familiar distinctions between having and exercising (in De anima) and between being in dunamis and being in energeia (in the Metaphysics) cannot be used to articulate adequately this peculiar mode of being of the soul of an embryo. We need the GA distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia to answer the question: does the embryo have soul?

Further, I will show how this distinction may also elucidate Aristotle’s coinage of the word entelecheia. Why not simply use the familiar existing word ἕξις (the noun from the Greek verb ἔχειν, which means to have), instead of coining such a complicated new word as entelecheia, to refer to the principle of a living substance? Since the mode of having the principle in the embryo and in the fully generated animal is different – the former having the principle in dunamis while the latter in a complete way (ἐντελής) – it appears fitting to refer to the latter mode of having as entelecheia, and not simply as ἕξις. I will propose that entelecheia corresponds to the mode of having soul in energeia in a generated animal, in contrast to the incomplete mode of having soul (in dunamis) that we find in an embryo.

The paper is divided into four sections. First, I will present the GA distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia (Section 1). Then, in the next two sections, I will compare the GA distinction with the De anima distinction between having and exercising (Section 2) and with the Metaphysics’ distinction between being in dunamis and being in energeia (Section 3) respectively. This comparison will help relate the GA distinction to these two more familiar distinctions and to show its uniqueness. Finally, I will explain how the distinction from the GA may shed light on Aristotle’s coinage of the term entelecheia.

 

1. Having in dunamis and Having in energeia in Aristotle’s GA

 

Aristotle is concerned with seeds in different treatises of his corpus.[11] It is only in the GA, however, that he directly addresses the question of whether a seed has the internal formal principle, that is, the soul. In GA II 1, he says:

 

It is evident both that the seed [σπέρμα] has soul and that it is in dunamis [καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἔστι δυνάμει]. And something can be closer or further away from itself in dunamis [ἐγγυτέρω δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι δυνάμει], just as the sleeping geometer is farther away from the waking geometer, and as the latter, in turn, is farther away from the one who is theorizing. Thus, no part of the seed is the cause of the generation, but rather that which has moved first from without. For nothing generates [γεννᾷ] itself by itself. But when it has been generated, it already grows itself by itself [ὅταν δὲ γένηται αὔξει ἤδη αὐτὸ ἑαυτό]. (GA II 1.735a8-14)[12]

 

In this passage, Aristotle uses the adverbial phrase being in dunamis (cf. ἔστι δυνάμει and εἶναι δυνάμει).[13] This phrase is based on the verb to be. However, he also uses another, different adverbial phrase, which is instead based on the verb to have. He says that the seed has soul in dunamis (ἔχει ... δυνάμει).[14]

Aristotle explains that at some point the seed is ready to grow by itself, while before it is not. As we know from the context of GA II 1 and elsewhere, by growing itself by itself (αὔξει … αὐτὸ ἑαυτό) Aristotle does not mean the accidental change of growth in size, but the coming to be of the organs that were not present before.[15] There is still a good deal of generation ahead until the seed becomes a complete animal. This path discloses successive modes of being, closer or farther away from the fully generated animal.[16]

It can be objected that, based on this passage alone, it is not certain that Aristotle is using the phrase having soul in dunamis. This observation is fair. I have purposely tried to convey this ambiguity in the translation: “that the seed has soul and that [it] is in dunamis (καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἔστι δυνάμει).” The subject of ‘being in dunamis’, namely ‘it’, is only implicit, and it can be interpreted as referring either to the seed or to the soul. If the former is the case, then we do not have here the phrase having soul in dunamis. Furthermore, given Aristotle’s use of the word seed (σπέρμα) to refer both to seeds at rest and to embryos, we may wonder in which of these two senses he is using the word in this passage.[17]

In sum, this passage from GA II 1 seems to be using the phrase having soul in dunamis, but it still leaves us with some open questions:[18] whether the subject of the phrase is the seed at rest or the embryo; whether Aristotle has in mind only the nutritive soul or also the other kinds of soul; and whether Aristotle is, in fact, using the phrase having soul in dunamis. Let us turn to another passage from the GA to address these questions.

In GA II 3, Aristotle takes up again the question of whether seeds (σπέρματα) and embryos (κυήματα)[19] have soul. In this context, he says:

 

It is evident that we must say that the seeds and the embryos [τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κυήματα] that are not yet separated have nutritive soul in dunamis, but not in energeia [τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχήν … ὅτι δυνάμει μὲν ἔχοντα θετέον, ἐνεργείᾳ δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντα] until (as those embryos that are separated) they draw the food and do the work of such a soul. First, it seems that such things live the life of a plant. Next, it is evident that the same must be said regarding the sensitive soul and the rational soul, for [the seeds and the embryos] must necessarily have all [kinds of soul] in dunamis before having them in energeia [πάσας γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον δυνάμει πρότερον ἔχειν ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ]. (GA II 3.736b8-15)

 

Concerning the soul [ψυχῆς], therefore, it has been explained how the embryos and the seminal fluid have it [πῶς ἔχει τὰ κυήματα καὶ ἡ γονή], and how they do not have it: for they have it in dunamis, but they do not have it in energeia [δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐκ ἔχει]. (GA II 3.737a16-18)

 

In these two passages, Aristotle is using without any ambiguity the adverbial phrases having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia. Furthermore, as we see in the first passage, this distinction concerns the different powers of the soul (not just the nutritive, but the sensitive power as well). And it is also clear from the phrase ‘seeds and embryos’ that he is thinking of the embryo when he says that it has soul in dunamis, for the embryo (κυήμα) is the first mixture of the male and female contributions, and it already has the two principles of generation.[20] The embryo already has the active generative principle from the male, which enables it to generate and grow by its own internal principle into a complete animal.

As Preus explains when commenting on this passage, to say that something has soul in dunamis is not simply a tricky way of saying that it does not have it.[21] While both the seed at rest (before the two gametes unite) and the embryo are in dunamis with respect to the generated animal, there is a radical ontological difference between the two. The former is not yet an animal in dunamis, while the latter is already an animal in a real way, albeit in dunamis. This is so because the former lacks a sensitive soul, while the latter has one.[22]

In another passage from GA II 5, Aristotle uses a similar adverbial phrase: “soul being present in dunamis”. He explains that the female cannot generate by herself because menses lack the active principle from the male. In this context, Aristotle says that “it is impossible that face or hand or flesh exist (or any other part) when the sensitive soul is not internally present either in energeia or in dunamis [μὴ ἐνούσης αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει], and either in some qualified way or simply.” (GA II 5.741a10-12). Once again, Aristotle implies that there is more than one way of having soul.

By means of the distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, Aristotle can offer an account of generation that avoids the two extremes of preformationism (all parts are already present from the outset; they merely grow) and of supervenience of form (the form is not present from the outset, but only supervenes at the end, when the change is completed). According to Aristotle, from the beginning, the embryo already has the principle, namely, the soul, but not yet the necessary organic parts of the body, which must be generated;[23] by the end of the generation, the animal can exercise all the proper functions because the relevant material parts have been completed.[24]

Thus, Aristotle’s account in the GA, following the paradoxical nature of generation, discloses a tension between having soul and being able to exercise its powers. As we will see in Section 2, this tension is not apparent in the De anima II 1 and II 5, where to have (ἔχειν) appears sufficient to be able to exercise (ἐνεργεῖν): the knower who has knowledge is able to put it to work whenever he wants. By contrast, this tension does appear in Metaphysics IX 7. As we will see in Section 3, the seed that is already an animal in dunamis – but not yet an animal in energeia – is the seed that already has the principle of generation (i.e., the soul), namely, the embryo (κυήμα).[25] Both the embryo and the fully generated animal have soul, but only the latter can exercise all the activities proper to the animal. Thus, according to this passage of the Metaphysics, it not the case that having soul is sufficient to have the dunamis to exercise all the functions. Beere has pointed out the paradoxical nature of this mode of being in dunamis. He says [my italics]:

 

The problem is that the human being in capacity, as here described, appears to have no place in an Aristotelian ontology, for it would have to fulfill incompatible conditions. On the one hand, the human being in capacity has to have the principle in virtue of which it becomes a human being. This principle is the human form. … On the other hand, the human being in capacity is not a human being in energeia, but merely in capacity. Thus it would seem that Aristotle here allows that there is something that has the form of human being, and is a material composite of that form and some correlative matter, and yet is only in capacity, not in energeia, a human being.[26]

 

Beere sketches some suggestions as to how this ontological problem may be addressed from the point of view of hylomorphism,[27] but he does not refer to the GA distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia to articulate the two different ways in which the embryo and the fully generated animal have the internal principle of soul. Preus raises a similar question when commenting on GA II 3:

 

Two interrelated problems arise from this interpretation: (i) Can it be ever proper, within or without Aristotle’s system, to say that something has a power which it cannot exercise now? (ii) Is it not self-contradictory to say that something has a soul (defined as first entelecheia) but does not have it in energeia?[28]

 

Preus briefly addresses these two questions, suggesting that powers may be present and still in need of other preconditions before they can be actualized. He also says, that “the supposed contradiction between the presence of an entelecheia and the absence of an energeia may be resolved by the specification of the precise entelecheia and energeia involved in the discussion.”[29] I think this is fine point, which may be presented in an even sharper way by replacing entelecheia with having (ἔχειν): the supposed contradiction may be resolved by specifying the relevant way of having that is at stake. In other words, the (apparently) single mode of having soul in De anima is now divided into two modes of having soul. And depending on the mode of being in which the soul is had, the substance has or lacks the dunamis to exercise the relevant activities.

Recent studies have explained which functions can, and cannot, be performed by the embryo in this mode of having soul in dunamis at this juncture of the embryological development.[30] My purpose in this section has rather been to show how the distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, unique to the GA, must be used to articulate the different ways in which the embryo and the complete animal have the internal principle: both have soul, but the embryo has soul only in dunamis.

In the following two sections, I will compare Aristotle’s GA distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, on the one hand, with the more familiar distinction between having and exercising in De anima, and with the Metaphysics’ distinction between being in dunamis and being in energeia, on the other. These two comparisons will serve to relate the GA to better-known Aristotelian distinctions, and, at the same time, to show how the GA distinction is necessary and unique to this treatise.

 

2. Having and Exercising in De anima II 1 and II 5

 

In De an. II 1, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of entelecheia: the first, analogous to sleep, is described as having knowledge without currently exercising it (ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν); the second, analogous to being awake, corresponds to exercising that knowledge.[31] The soul, Aristotle says, is an entelecheia of the first kind, while the body that is capable of living is the one that has a soul. In contrast, the seed and the fruit are such a body only in dunamis.[32] It is important to note that the seed that Aristotle is considering here is not the embryo, but rather the seed prior to fertilization, before the generation has started.[33]

In De an. II 5, on the other hand, Aristotle explains that we call not only someone currently engaged in the activity of knowing a knower (ἐπιστήμων, 417a23), but also someone not using his knowledge; and even someone who does not yet know, provided that person is able to acquire knowledge at some point. The knower who already has the knowledge and is exercising it is the primary instance of what it is to be a knower (ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος): that person is a knower according to the mode of energeia (κατ’ ἐνέργειαν).[34] The other two are knowers according to the mode of dunamis (κατὰ δύναμιν), but they differ from one another: one is capable of knowing because that person can be taught, the other because that person already has the knowledge and thus is able to exercise it whenever he wants.[35] Aristotle does not have a specific name for each kind of dunamis, but he illustrates this distinction by contrasting the mode of being of a boy and that of an adult as regards the exercise of warfare.[36]

The second mode of dunamis and the mode of energeia of De an. II 5 correspond to Aristotle’s distinction between the first kind of entelecheia and the other kind of entelecheia in De an. II 1 respectively. A threefold scheme emerges from relating these distinctions to one another.[37] Aristotle is describing the different modes of being by using primarily three words and their cognates: capacity or ability (δύναμις, δυνατός, δύνασθαι, κατὰ δύναμιν), having (ἔχειν, ἐντελέχεια, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν), and exercising (ἐνεργεῖν, ἐνέργεια, κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἐνεργείᾳ γίνονται). Here is an outline of the threefold scheme that emerges:

(1) Knower according to dunamis	- Does not have knowledge - Is able to acquire it by learning
(2) Knower according to dunamis        Analogous to being-asleep	- Has knowledge - Is able to exercise that knowledge whenever he wants - Is not currently exercising that knowledge
(3) Knower according to energeia        Analogous to being-awake	- Has knowledge - Is able to exercise that knowledge whenever he wants - Is currently exercising that knowledge

 

Mode (1) corresponds to the progenitors’ gametes prior to their union: these seeds are not yet an animal, but only potentially an animal; they do not have the internal active principle of an animal.[38] Mode (2) corresponds to the animal that has been fully generated, an animal that has a soul and therefore the dunamis to exercise the vital functions of an animal.

But what about an embryo, which is in the process of generation? On the one hand, the embryo is essentially different from (1) the gametes, because the embryo already has soul and is no longer at rest, but actively developing by its own internal principle. On the other hand, there is also some difference between the embryo and (2) the fully generated animal, because the former is not yet able to exercise activities proper to the species. Now, the way Aristotle contrasts Modes (1) and (2) in De an. II 1 and II 5, presents having soul as sufficient for having the dunamis to exercise the proper living functions. This is not, however, the case with the embryo, which already has soul but does not yet have the dunamis to exercise all its proper activities. The embryo corresponds neither to Mode (1) nor to Mode (2), but rather seems to belong somewhere in-between these modes.[39]

In De an. II 5, Aristotle does consider a mode of being between (1) and (2), namely, the transition from the former mode to the latter, as a foil to the mode of being of the activity of sensation. The former transition is exemplified by the acquisition of knowledge and by the acquisition of sensitive soul by the seed under the agency of the male progenitor.[40] Despite the complexities of this passage,[41] Aristotle’s main point is clear: the activity of sensation is neither a replacement nor a development, but a sort of special alteration (ἀλλοίωσίς τις) different from both.[42]

For our purposes, the transition that is relevant is that between Mode (1) and Mode (2), which corresponds to the acquisition of the power of sensation by the seed. We are looking for a notion to articulate the mode of being of the embryo, a notion which seems to lie between these two modes of being. Aristotle explains [I add the numbers, which correspond to the modes]:

 

Thus, the first two knowers, who are knowers according to dunamis, come to be knowers in energeia, (1) one through the alteration that learning is … (2) the other in another way: from (2) having the knowledge of arithmetic or grammar, but not exercising it, to (3) exercising it [ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν] … And the first change [πρώτη μεταβολή] of the sense comes to be by the agency of the progenitor [ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος], while once it has been generated, (2) it has already the power to sense [ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη] in the same way as knowledge is had. And (3) the actual exercise of sensation is said in the same way as theorizing. (De an. II 5.417a30-b19)

 

The generation of the sensitive power by the male progenitor, which Aristotle calls the first change (πρώτη μεταβολή),[43] lies between Mode (1) to Mode (2). This change, however, is an activity (generation) rather than the subject[44] of the activity (the embryo) or its active principle (the soul). Furthermore, in De an. II 5, Aristotle is considering the generation of the power of sensation as already completed, rather than as ongoing. He says that once the animal has been fully generated, that is, at Mode (2), then the animal already has the dunamis of sensation.[45] Aristotle says nothing about whether during the process of generation the embryo has or does not have such dunamis.

Let us take stock. In De an. II 1 and II 5, Aristotle draws some distinctions that are helpful to articulate the mode of being of the termini of the generation of the embryo, namely, (1) the gametes and (2) the fully generated animal, as well as the powers of these termini: the former lacks, while the latter has, the relevant principle. None of the distinctions from De anima, however, correspond to the mode of being of the embryo as the subject of generation; nor can these distinctions articulate the difference between the mode of being of the internal principle (i.e., the soul) in the embryo and the mode of being of the soul in the fully generated animal.

This is not a mistake on Aristotle’s part though, because in De anima he is not interested in the mode of being of the subject of generation nor in the mode of being of its principle while the generation is ongoing.[46] Nevertheless, the triple scheme that emerges from De anima proves helpful to framing the mode of being of the embryo: the embryo lies between Mode (1) and Mode (2), the termini of the generation; and the embryo is the subject of the transition from the former mode to the latter.

In the following section I will turn to Metaphysics IX 7, where Aristotle applies the distinction between being in dunamis and being in energeia to natural substances in the process of becoming. We will see how the notion of being an animal in dunamis adequately captures the mode of being of the embryo as the subject of generation. At the same time, we will see that such a mode of being cannot be used to articulate the mode of being of the principle (soul) of the embryo.

 

 

 

 

3. Being an Animal in dunamis and

 Being an Animal in energeia in Metaphysics IX 7

 

Dunamis and energeia are one of the four senses of being that Aristotle distinguishes in Metaph. V 7 and VI 2. In Book IX of the Metaphysics, Aristotle explains these notions in more detail. He wants to reach a common account of energeia, including not only change, but substance as well, and to show that energeia has priority over dunamis. For our purposes, the relevant passage is found in Metaph. IX 7, where Aristotle addresses the question of when something is already in dunamis. Not just anything, nor at any time, Aristotle argues, is a particular being in dunamis. For example, earth is not yet a statue in dunamis, because it must first be changed into bronze, which is then already a statue in dunamis. In turn, bronze comes to be a statue in energeia by the efficient causality of the sculptor.

Aristotle asks when something can be said to be already in dunamis, and he presupposes a process of generation, as Beere and Johansen note.^[47] Aristotle is after a universal criterion to find out when, in this process of becoming, something can first be said to be in dunamis. It turns out, however, that we need two separate criteria: one for things whose principle is internal (i.e., natural and living beings), for example, a human being or an animal, and another for things whose principle is external, such as a house or any other artifact. Aristotle says:

 

We must distinguish when each is in dunamis [πότε δυνάμει ἔστιν] and when it is not, for it is not in dunamis just at any time. For example, is earth a man in dunamis? Or not yet, but rather when it has already become seed? Or not even then perhaps? … Similarly, with the house in dunamis: if nothing in it, or in the matter, impedes the coming to be of a house, and if there is no need to add or to take away or to change [μεταβαλεῖν], then that is a house in dunamis – the same occurs in all cases in which the principle of generation [ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως] is external –. And in those cases where the principle is in that which has it [τῷ ἔχοντι], when it will come to be by itself if nothing external impedes it. To illustrate: the seed is not yet [οὔπω] a human being in dunamis, for it must fall in another and change [μεταβάλλειν]; but when it is already [ἤδη] such by its own principle, then it is a human being in dunamis. The former lacks the other principle [ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται], as the earth is not yet a statue in dunamis. (Metaph. IX 7.1048b37-1049a18)

 

In the case of things whose principle of generation is external, the criterion for when something can be said to be in dunamis, simply put, is that no further change is necessary for it to be ready to become such a thing by the agency of its external principle. Accordingly, bricks are already a house in dunamis, while earth is not yet a house in dunamis, because earth must first be changed into bricks. Once changed into bricks, these are ready to become a house by the agency of the housebuilder. For living beings, the criterion is different, because the principle of generation (ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως) is internal.[48] In this case, the criterion for being in dunamis is to have the internal principle of generation. This principle is acquired by a change (μεταβαλεῖν) effected by the male progenitor.[49] The first knower in De an. II 5 fails to meet this criterion.[50]

In all cases, something comes to be already in dunamis through a change. The difference is that the result of that change is, for non-living beings, a passive disposition to be acted upon by an external cause, while in the case of living beings, the result of that change is the acquisition of the internal active principle of generation. As Aristotle explains, once the seed has the principle of generation, it comes to be by its own principle.[51] Only then, and not before (οὔπω), we can say that the seed is already (ἤδη) a particular living being in dunamis.

At this point we must recall the distinction between the seed at rest (the gametes), which lacks (δεῖται) the principle of generation, and the embryo, which already has (ἔχειν) the principle of generation and is in the process of being generated. Aristotle’s claim is that the former is not yet a human being in dunamis, while the latter already is such. The transition from the former to the latter is a change (μεταβολή), through which, by the agency of the male progenitor, the principle of generation is acquired.

The change Aristotle is referring to in this passage, namely, the change whose completion marks the first stage at which something is already in dunamis in the case of living beings, is a part of what he calls the first change (πρώτη μεταβολή) in De an. II 5.[52] The terminus ad quem of the change that Aristotle is referring to in Metaph. IX 7 is not birth, nor the completion of the generation. Rather, by the end of this first change, which marks when something can first be said to be in dunamis, the generation is still ongoing, but now under the agency of the embryo’s own internal principle. The animal cannot yet exercise all its powers: it is still an animal in dunamis and not fully in energeia. Accordingly, in the process of the generation of an animal we must distinguish between (a) the passive acquisition of the principle of becoming by the external agency of the male progenitor, on the one hand, and (b) the active generation of the animal by its own internal principle, on the other. The completion of the former marks the beginning of the latter.[53] The subject of (a) is (1) the gametes, while the subject of (b) is the embryo, which is no longer merely potentially an animal, but rather already an animal in dunamis. The former does not yet have, while the latter already has, the principle of generation.

To distinguish modes of being in Metaph. IX 7, Aristotle favors the adverbial phrase with the verb to be (εἶναι), namely, being in dunamis and being in energeia, over the phrase based on the verb to have (ἔχειν), which is prominent in De anima. It is telling, however, that the criterion that Aristotle gives in Metaph. IX 7 for living beings ultimately reduces being in dunamis to having a principle: something is already a particular being in dunamis when it no longer lacks, but already has, the internal principle and is thus becoming on its own. This connection between being and having invites us to correlate the modes of being of Metaph. IX 7 to the modes of being of De anima in the following way. I will use the example of an animal:

1) Being potentially an animal (the gamete(s))     ↓ (a) change by the external progenitor	does not have the principle
(*)[54] Being an animal in dunamis (embryo)     ↓ (b) change by its own internal principle	has the principle (i.e., the soul) but lacks the dunamis to exercise
(2) A generated animal at rest       Analogous to being-asleep	has the principle (i.e., the soul) and has the dunamis to exercise
(3) A generated animal at work       Analogous to being-awake	has the principle (i.e., the soul) has the dunamis to exercise and is currently exercising

 

While among the various modes of being of De anima we do not find one that corresponds to the embryo, (*) the mode of being an animal in dunamis, as described by Aristotle in Metaph. IX 7, does correspond to the embryo as the subject of (b) generation. The embryo is an animal in dunamis because it already has the principle of generation and is becoming a fully generated animal by its own internal principle. Thus, the Metaphysics provides us with a notion (being in dunamis) that is suitable to articulate the mode of being of the embryo as subject.

Nevertheless, the notion of being an animal in dunamis from Metaph. IX 7 still raises important questions.^[55] The most relevant for our purposes is the problem of how to articulate the different ways in which (*) the embryo and (2) the generated animal have soul. In fact, both are said to have the principle, but only the latter has the dunamis to exercise all the relevant powers. As I mentioned earlier, in De anima, to have (ἔχειν) a principle or power appears to be sufficient for having the dunamis to exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) that power: (2) the person who has knowledge of geometry can (3) exercise that knowledge whenever he wants. By contrast, (*) the embryo has soul but not yet the dunamis to exercise all its powers. Having the principle, therefore, is not sufficient in this case to have the relevant powers.

We have already discussed how this mode of being of the soul of the embryo is puzzling. It is now apparent why Aristotle must draw a distinction between two modes of having soul in the GA, namely, having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, when directly facing the question: does the embryo have soul or not? We cannot simply say that the embryo has soul without qualification. It does have soul, but in a different way. Accordingly, we need to divide having soul into two different ways, namely, in dunamis and in energeia, which is precisely what we find in the GA. To say that the embryo has soul in dunamis is the correct way to articulate this paradoxical mode of being of the soul during the process of generation.

In the following and final section, I will turn to the other way of having soul, namely, having soul in energeia. I will show that this second member of the GA distinction is also relevant, because it may illuminate why Aristotle coined such a strange word as entelecheia.

 

4. Entelecheia: Having Soul in energeia

 

The word entelecheia is Aristotle’s own coinage. It has been translated into English by different words: actuality,[56] fulfillment,[57] realization.[58] It is agreed that the word includes the roots of τέλος (perfection, completion) and of ἔχειν (to have), but its precise etymology remains obscure and has not yet been settled, despite much discussion.[59] In this section, I will show how the GA distinction can illuminate Aristotle’s coinage of this word. I will do so by comparing Aristotle’s account of the mode of being of motion as an incomplete energeia (ἀτελὴς ἐνέργεια) in the Physics with the distinction in the GA between having in dunamis and having in energeia.

In Phys. III 1-2, Aristotle describes motion as the entelecheia of a dunamis as such.[60] He also uses the word energeia to describe motion, while qualifying that it is an energeia of a special sort: an incomplete one (ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναί τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ).[61] Two of the definitions of motion are relevant for our purposes. Aristotle says:

 

The entelecheia of that which is in dunamis, when, while being in entelecheia, it exercises [ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὂν ἐνεργῇ], not as such [i.e., not as in entelecheia] but as movable, is motion. (Phys. III 1.201a27-29)

 

Motion seems to be some sort of energeia, but incomplete [ἀτελής]. The reason why it is incomplete is because that which is capable, to which the energeia belongs, is incomplete [ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατόν, οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια]. And this is why it is difficult to grasp what it is, for it must be placed either under privation or dunamis or energeia simply; but none of these appears to be possible. It remains then the way we have said, namely, that it is a sort of energeia, an energeia such as we have described, difficult to conceive, but possible to exist. (Phys. III 2.201b31-202a3)

 

From the first passage, I will just note that it openly discloses the temporal aspect of motion, which remains opaque in De anima. In De an. II 5, Aristotle moves directly from (1) the seed that lacks the principle, to (2) the fully generated animal that already (and fully) has the principle (ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη – recall the aorist aspect)[62] and is at rest. Aristotle, in De an. II 5, is thus considering the transition from (1) to (2) as a change that has been completed, not as an ongoing one. By contrast, in Phys. III 1, Aristotle is considering motion as an ongoing change, thus displaying its temporal character (ὅταν ... ἐνεργῇ – note the present aspect).

In the second passage, Aristotle acknowledges how difficult it is to grasp the nature of motion. Motion is neither simply dunamis nor simply energeia. Rather, he explains, motion is a sort of incomplete energeia (ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι),[63] in contrast to those energeiai that are complete, as for example the activity of seeing.[64]

The contrast between complete and incomplete energeia corresponds to what Anagnostopoulos calls the telic structure criterion.[65] As he explains, this is neither the only criterion to approach change, nor the most basic one. Rather, the most fundamental criterion to distinguish change from complete activities is what he calls the subject criterion, which the definition of change yields:[66] “Changes are incomplete because their subjects are incomplete beings.”[67] Despite how counterintuitive the idea of an incomplete energeia may sound, Aristotle clearly says that the energeia is incomplete “because (ὅτι) that which is capable, to which the energeia belongs, is incomplete (ἀτελής).” In other words, the energeia is incomplete because its subject is incomplete during the process of becoming.

Incomplete energeia concerns the mode of being of a change (e.g., generation), which is one kind of activity; it does not concern the mode of being of the subject of a change (e.g., the embryo), nor of its principle (e.g., the soul of the embryo). The explanation of why the activity of change is incomplete, however, gives us a clue to understand why we may also speak of an incomplete (ἀτελής) way of having (ἔχειν) the principle: if change, considered as an energeia, is incomplete because its subject is still incomplete,[68] we can also conceive of an incomplete way of having the principle for the same reason, namely, because the subject of the principle is incomplete. In both cases, it is the paradoxical nature of change that is creating the tension of something’s being in itself complete (i.e., the energeia as such and the soul as such) and, at the same time, incomplete in virtue of the incompleteness of its subject.

What is incomplete in the embryo, as I mentioned earlier, is the material side of the composite substance. The generation of a living substance goes hand in hand with the generation of the material organs that are necessary to have the dunamis to exercise the proper functions. Accordingly, generation has a principle (ἀρχή) and a completion (τέλος). Given the composition of living substances (i.e., matter and form) and the internal and primordial character of their form,[69] during the process of becoming the subject of generation of a living substance is not yet fully complete (it is rather ἀ-τελής) and, nevertheless, at the same time, it already has the principle. The coincidence of having the formal principle with being materially incomplete is precisely what characterizes the animal in dunamis (i.e., the embryo) of Metaph. IX 7: the embryo is already (*) an animal in dunamis, and no longer simply (1) potentially an animal, because it already has the principle and, therefore, the dunamis to actively become on its own. On the other hand, the embryo is not yet (2) an animal in energeia, because, due to its material incompleteness, it still lacks the dunamis to exercise all the functions.

Here is an interesting passage from the GA where Aristotle connects the incomplete mode of being of the subject with its incomplete material development:

 

Since it [the embryo] is already an animal in dunamis, but not complete [δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῷον ἀτελὲς δέ], it must take the nourishment from elsewhere, so that it makes use of the womb that holds it – as a plant makes use of the earth – in order to take the nourishment until it is eventually completed [ἕως ἂν τελεωθῇ] so as to be already [ἤδη] an animal with the dunamis to move around. (GA II 4.740a24-27)

 

In this passage, Aristotle uses the adverbial phrase of Metaph. IX 7 (namely, being in dunamis) to describe the mode of being of the embryo during the process of becoming. He does not focus on the principle of generation, but rather on its subject. The embryo has the dunamis to actively become, because it already has the principle and goes on its own, even if it still needs the assistance of the mother to take nourishment. Thus, it is already (*) an animal in dunamis, and not simply (1) potentially an animal. However, since the developing seed is still incomplete and lacks the proper organs to move around, it is not yet (2) an animal in energeia, and, therefore, does not yet have the dunamis to exercise the locomotive function. This passage from the GA shows how being an animal in dunamis and the incomplete character of the subject of generation (i.e., the embryo) are causally connected: a principle is incomplete when its subject is incomplete.

Elsewhere, Aristotle refers to the incomplete activity as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, while referring to the complete activity as energeia simply (ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια)[70] or as τελεία ἐνέργεια.[71] Analogously, I think that the GA distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia is precisely Aristotle’s way of referring to the incomplete and complete ways of having the principle of soul respectively. This correlation sheds light on why Aristotle may have coined the word entelecheia: since there are two ways of having the principle, and not just one, it is appropriate to have a specific word for the complete way of having the principle. Aristotle coined the word entelecheia, corresponding to the phrase having soul in energeia in the GA, to refer to the complete mode of having the principle. This fits well with the two roots of the word, namely, ἔχειν (to have) and ἐντελής (complete).

The existence of two different ways of having the principle also explains why the word entelecheia is not redundant with the word ἕξις (habit, the substantivized form of the verb ἔχειν): as we speak of two kinds of energeia (complete and incomplete), so too we can speak of two kinds of habit: complete and incomplete ones. And just as the phrase τελεία ἐνέργεια is not redundant with energeia – the phrase signals that at some previous point the energeia was incomplete[72] – so too the word entelecheia is not redundant with ἕξις: the word entelecheia signals that at some previous point the principle was had in an incomplete way.[73] Here is an outline of the comparison I am proposing between energeia and entelecheia from the point of view of completion:

           

Incomplete Subject                               Complete Subject

 

ἔργον, ἐνέργεια                        ἐνέργεια ἀτελής                                       τελεία ἐνέργεια

 

ἔχειν, ἕξις                                 ἔχειν [X] δυνάμει                                    ἔχειν [X] ἐνεργείᾳ

                                                                                                              ἐντελέχεια

                               

As the outline shows, entelecheia corresponds to the mode of being that Aristotle calls in the GA having in energeia. An interesting and somewhat speculative question, which I will only briefly allude to, is which word (and not just which phrase)[74] would then be the correlative to entelecheia. Aristotle did not coin any such word, but I think that he could have done so in at least two ways. The first one would be ˂ἀτελέχεια˃ (incomplete having). While this is not a word documented in Greek, it would be the natural counterpart of the word entelecheia, given that the contrary of the adjective ἐντελής (complete) is the adjective ἀτελής (incomplete), both of which are common adjectives in Greek and frequently used by Aristotle himself.

The second possible word correlative to entelecheia would be ˂ἐναρχήχεια˃. Again, while this is not a word documented in Greek, it appears as another natural counterpart of the word entelecheia given the correlation between ἀρχή and τέλος. Having the ἀρχή and having the τέλος (entelecheia) are correlative terms.[75] The τέλος is that which comes to be last in genesis,[76] while the ἀρχή is that which comes to be first. Thus, the completion of the genesis is rightly called entelecheia, and not simply ἕξις. By contrast, the beginning of the genesis is already a having (ἔχειν), but still incomplete (ἀ-τελής), and, accordingly, not yet an entelecheia. When the subject, say an embryo, has the ἀρχή, and not yet the τέλος, we say that it has soul in dunamis and that it is an animal in dunamis;[77] we do not say that it has the τέλος. On the other hand, the development from ἀρχή to τέλος is not the acquisition of a soul that before was not present:[78] having the ἀρχή is the initial mode of having the soul while the subject is not yet complete, but still in the process of becoming; while having the τέλος (entelecheia) is the final mode of having the soul.[79]

 

Conclusion

 

Aristotle’s distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, unique to the GA, has not received the attention it merits in the scholarly literature. As I have shown in this paper, this distinction is relevant to Aristotle’s account of modes of being in two important ways. First, it provides the correct notion to articulate the mode of being of the soul-principle of an embryo – a notion which is not provided by Aristotle in his more well-known discussions of modes of being in De anima or the Metaphysics. In answering the question of whether the developing seed has soul, we can say neither that it does not have it (οὐκ ἔχειν) nor that it has it (ἔχειν) without qualification; we need to clarify that the developing seed has soul in an incomplete, undeveloped way. The notion of having soul in dunamis adequately articulates the paradoxical mode of being of the soul principle of an embryo in the process generation: due to the incompletion of its subject, the embryo does not yet have the soul in a mode of being that would allow the exercise of all its powers (ἐνεργεῖν).

Second, the GA distinction also sheds light on Aristotle’s coinage of the word entelecheia as the appropriate counterpart of the incomplete way in which embryos have soul. Entelecheia corresponds to what Aristotle calls having soul in energeia in the GA, the mode of having soul that is complete, fully developed. Aristotle describes the mode of having that is not complete by the phrase having soul in dunamis. Since there are two modes of having the principle, a complete and an incomplete one, the words ἔχειν and ἕξις are ambiguous in a way in which Aristotle’s new word entelecheia is not. So, it is fitting to have a particular technical term, i.e., entelecheia, for the complete mode of having the principle.

Considering these two points together, it is worth noting that at least some of Aristotle’s technical and novel notions, which he uses in other fields, seem to have been forged in the context of his biological investigations. Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics, in contrast to Plato, has sprung, so to speak, from his grappling with the phenomena of life, and not from mathematical inquiries.

The order of Aristotle’s works remains controversial to this day. The differences I have pointed out in the use of the notion of ἐντελέχεια between the Generation of Animals and other treatises such as De anima, the Physics, and Metaphysics may be helpful in illuminating the order in which Aristotle wrote these treatises. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper, though it is a question worth pursuing.[80] The same goes for Aristotle’s enigmatic claim in the Generation of Animals that intellect alone comes from without (τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν),[81] which I have not discussed in this paper. In what sense can intellect become an ἐντελέχεια of the body if it comes from without? The same problem appears in De anima, albeit from a different perspective: in what sense is intellect the ἐντελέχεια of the body?[82]

 There are other interesting uses of the notions of dunamis and energeia in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals that deserve a more detailed study.[83] In this paper I have focused on the distinction between having soul in dunamis and having soul in energeia, which shows that the Generation of Animals is a treatise that is relevant not only for those interested in Aristotle’s biology, but also for those interested in his metaphysics.

 

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