A hypothetical premise about eternal
cosmic motion in Physics VIII 1.250B13
This paper is concerned with an important variant reading discovered at the beginning of Book VIII of Aristotle’s Physics. The reading is found in J, the oldest manuscript of this work (Vind. phil. gr. 100, 9th c.): at VIII 1.250b13, J reads εἰ ἦν, “if it [scil. the movement] was”, instead of ἀεὶ ἦν, “it always was”, the only reading so far taken into account. Several early witnesses support J: E (Paris. gr. 1853, 10th c.), the Greek into Latin translation by James of Venice (first half of the 12th c., si erat); the earliest Arabic version (ap. Jabir ibn Hayyan, ان كانت, “if [the movement] was”). Such early sources thus agree as witnesses of a hypothetical premise concerning the eternity of cosmic motion against the standard vulgate text of the Physics. Once the if-reading at 250b13 is accepted, as opposed to the vulgate, Aristotle’s conclusion about the eternity of motion will apply not absolutely, but under the condition of the given premise that in no plausible way could motion have begun in time. The difference is important on several grounds. In particular, it fits better with the manner in which the argument is then developed by Aristotle throughout chapter 1 of Phys. VIII and with the parallel discussion about the eternity of the cosmos in De caelo I 10 and Metaphysics Λ 6. However, favouring the variant reading of J for Phys. 250b13 raises the problem of evaluating with special care the authority of manuscript J for the textual constitution of the Physics, which remains an open question for future scholarship.
Keywords
Aristotle’s Physics, Eternity of the World, Vindobonensis phil. gr. 100,
Variant Readings, Philosophical Imperfect
Author
Silvia Fazzo
Università del Piemonte Orientale
This paper is concerned with a variant reading in the first sentence of Physics VIII. The newly discovered reading contains a conditional premise concerning the eternal nature of cosmic motion.[1]
I shall begin by analysing the sentence according to Ross’ standard critical edition (Oxford, 1936 and TLG), chap. 1.250b11-15:[2]
Πότερον (i) γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις οὐκ οὖσα πρότερον, καὶ | φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, (ii) ἢ οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτε | φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, (iii) καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ | ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει | συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν;
(i) Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being, and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion?
(ii) Or it never had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be – (iii) for it is in fact immortal and never-failing, a property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all things constituted by nature?
This construction is dense and articulated. It firstly expresses the two branches of the fundamental dilemma – whether movement (i) is generated and perishable or (ii) is eternal. The dilemma is followed by (iii) Aristotle’s commentary on the second option – no doubt, an implicit endorsement of it: movement, if eternal – Aristotle says – permeates the world forever, as if it were a breath of life joining together all beings, even though they are born naturally and perishable.
In the vulgate, at first glance, the dilemma is clear. From the outset, we understand that Aristotle prefers (ii), because of his commentary in (iii), especially the powerful and harmonious worldview at the end of the clause. Nevertheless, it is not clear that everything is in the right place in the description of (ii) the second branch of the dilemma. There, at 250b13, the ἀεὶ ἦν option – an alternative to the Presocratic view of ancient cosmogonies – implies that movement and the cosmos do not arise but have always existed and will last forever. Hence, ἀεὶ ἦν is taken to mean “it was always” in the sense of “it (i.e., motion, see 250b11) has been there ever since”.
Several doubts, nevertheless, arise.
a) Why, while expressing a preference in his subsequent comments (iii), does Aristotle not provide reasons or explanations for his choice? He seems to axiomatize in a context where asserting an uncontroversial truth is highly unlikely.[3]
b) Why does Aristotle subsequently describe the same scenario three times in such a concise text? The sentence states that motion is not born and does not get destroyed in (iia) ἢ οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτε φθείρεται, and again in (iib) ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, then it repeats that motion does not get destroyed: (iii) καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον.
c) Does ἀεί (unspecified, without a further particle, see LSJ s.v.) really mean “since ever”?
d) Does ἦν mean “it was” in the sense of “it has been” – either in standard classical Greek, or in Aristotle’s philosophical context? Or, as an alternative, what else might it mean? In Greek, “the imperfect not only locates a state of affairs in the past, it also presents this state of affairs as not-closed, as on-going”.[4] On the other hand, Aristotle’s theory of principles has its own immanent grammar, which remarkably includes the ‘philosophical’ imperfect tense of the verb to be, ἦν. Its most idiomatic construction is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. There, ἦν stands in the middle and conveys eternal identity with oneself.[5] Eternal identity with oneself must be the kind of eternity which is at issue in Aristotle’s theory of principles: it is appropriate to essences and principles of things, which always are in the way they are. If so, one has to understand ἦν alone, in 250b13 and in the occurrences of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, in the sense “it was always”: in either case, the state described by ἦν is ongoing and everlasting. If so, neither case requires ἦν, Aristotle’s ‘philosophical imperfect’, to be coupled with the adverb ἀεί.
In fact, ἀεὶ ἦν at VIII 1.250b13 is not the only reading in ancient manuscripts. A different reading without ἀεί is available in the earliest manuscript of this work, J, Vind. phil. gr. 100, dating back to slightly after the middle of the 9th century (Irigoin 1957).[6]
The reading implies an if-clause: “but if it was, it will always be too”. See the relevant words in J (Fig. 1):
i.e. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν.
Paleographically, the two concurrent readings, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν and ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν, differ due to the presence or absence of the single letter α (alpha). Which reading is more likely to arise from the other? Can their textual history be reconstructed?
Semantically, the difference is conspicuous because the logical reasoning is different: by an if-clause, the eternity of motion is not postulated absolutely, but under a given condition. Which reading, then, is more likely to express Aristotle’s original argument?
With regard to Aristotle, it can be argued that J’s reading is preferable, because, if it is accepted, all of the previously difficulties are resolved. For: a) the if-clause offers the criterion to resolve the fundamental dilemma of eternity vs coming-to-be of the world (as can be seen more clearly in De caelo I 10 as a relevant parallel passage; see Appendix below); b) unlike the vulgate text, J’s text does not imply a repetition in this sentence but a questioning of the main thesis to be argued for; c) ἀεί before ἦν at b13 does not occur; d) ἦν exemplifies Aristotle’s philosophical imperfect: this is appropriate when talking about anything which was in the sense of now and forever.
More important still, J’s if-reading fits better with the way the argument is then developed throughout chapter 1 of Phys. VIII, as analysed by Wians in the present issue of Aristotelica: Aristotle struggles and dichotomizes with previous cosmogonies and with possible reasonings about motion’s coming to be at some point in the past (ποτε at 250b11); hence, his major argument against the ceasing of motion in the future.[7]
It is unfortunate, therefore, that the reading of 250b13 in J is misreported in Ross’ critical apparatus: it reads ἀλλ’ εἴην, instead of ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν.[8] This seems to be one of the main reasons why the variant reading in J has not attracted any editorial attention[9] and why the standard reading ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν at 250b13 has so far not been questioned.
Moreover, in Ross’ critical apparatus, the reading of E, Paris. gr. 1853, which is the second oldest Greek manuscript of the Physics (10th c.), is ignored. Even today, the reading of E at 250b13 goes unnoticed by scholars. It is very close to J, offering the same sequence of three words, but without elision and with hiatus (Fig. 2):
i.e. ἀλλὰ εἰ ἦν.
The interest of the unelided reading in E is twofold. On the one hand, it is identical in meaning with J: E also reads εἰ ἦν, even if E, where the Physics is concerned, does not depend on J. If it is true, as is commonly held, that J and E have significantly different sources, this increases their weight as witnesses of an if-clause at Phys. VIII 1.[10]
On the other hand, based on E’s unelided reading, one can at least figure out a possible transmission path:
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν > ἀλλὰ εἰ ἦν > ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν.
In this way, the vulgate reading ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν could have arisen from ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν.[11]
In this way, the vulgate reading ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν could have arisen from ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν by the 12th century (if not before), when it is found in at least two manuscripts: Ms. Ambrosianus M 46, 12th c., f. 122r5, not collated so far, to the best of my knowledge, and Ms. Laurentianus 87.24 (K ap. Hasper 2021). After that point, most later manuscripts offer the vulgate ἀεὶ ἦν reading, with very few exceptions (mss. w and b ap. Hasper 2021).[12]
Seeking for different paths, we are left with the possibility of an indirect tradition, based on earlier sources than the extant manuscripts. According to the scholarly literature and to critical apparatuses, it might seem that most of the indirect tradition sides with the vulgate. Whether this holds true or not needs to be verified.
1. The Textual History of VIII 1.250b13 in the Indirect Tradition
In fact, the corruption of εἰ into ἀεί could not have influenced the manuscript used a few decades before by James of Venice for his Latin translation of the Physics.
Here is James’ translatio vetus based on the deperditus codex Λ:
Utrum autem factus sit aliquando motus cum non esset prius, et corrumpitur iterum sic quod que moveri nichil sit, aut neque factus neque corrumpitur, sed si erat, et semper erit, et hoc immortale et sine quiete inest his quae sunt, ut vita quedam natura subsistentibus omnibus?
This plainly coincides with the reading in J:
Πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις οὐκ οὖσα πρότερον, καὶ
Φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, ἢ οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτε
φθείρεται, ἀλλ' [ἀλλὰ E] εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ
ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει
συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν;[13]
James’ translation thus sides with J. [14]
Further witnesses from the indirect tradition include late ancient Greek commentators and Arabic translators, insofar as the reading of the Greek manuscripts they used can be reconstructed. We need to focus on the vulgate reading:
ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται,
which is to be contrasted with the reading in J:
εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται.
There is no exact quotation of either reading in Simplicius. His closest string of words reads:
ἦν δὲ ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται κίνησις (p. 1118.23 Diels).
It appears that Simplicius is not interested in developing Aristotle’s hypothetical setting of the problem; in this regard, he is closer to the vulgate. The question, however, arises: if Simplicius’ Aristotelian text was ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, why does he postpone the adverb ἀεί to the verb ἦν? And why does he make the effort to refer a single adverb ἀεί to both tenses of the verb to be, ἦν and ἔσται? It would have been enough to repeat ἀεί twice, if this was his transmitted string of words. We can therefore conclude that Simplicius’ paraphrase does not entirely support either the reading in J or the vulgate reading of 250b13 because it does not have either the duplication of the adverb or the conditional conjunction εἰ.
A similar assessment can be given for the main witness of the Greek into Arabic tradition of Phys. VIII. The only preserved Arabic version of Phys. VIII as a whole is that of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s (d. 910). It is transmitted as a series of Arabic textus within Averroes’ Great Commentary on Physics VIII. It is now available in a major critical edition by Rüdiger Arnzen (Brill 2021) with two critical apparatuses. The first of these, by Pieter Haspers, provides data from all relevant Greek sources. The Greek Vorlage of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s translation is given the siglum Ψ.
With regard to 250b13, Hasper attributes to Ψ the standard ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται reading. I agree that no if-clause can be found in Ψ; however, it is worth going into greater detail. The passage is textus n. 1, and in Arnzen’s edition, it is at p. 1:
ليت شعري هل حدثت الحركة ولم تکن قبلُ وهل تفسد أَيضاً فإِذاً لا يكون معه شيء أَصلاً يتحرّك أَم الحركة لم تحدث ولا تفسد لكنّها لم تزل فيما مضی ولا تزال أَبداً وهذا أَمر لا بواد له وليست تفتر في الموجودات بل كأَنّها حياة ما لجميع ما قوامه بالطبيعة؟
As is evident, this translation is not literal. Indeed, while it does not preserve any if-clause, it also does not duplicate the ἀεί: if ἀεί is rendered with أَبداً, this appears only once. Therefore, one cannot infer with certainty that this version precisely presupposes the vulgate ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται as the basis of Ψ.[15]
By contrast, the hypothetical protasis ‘if-it-was’ is found in an earlier Arabic version, ap. Jābir ibn Ḥayyān:
ليت شعري كانت الحركة لم تزل أو كانت بعد أن لم تکن وهل تدثر بعد کونها إِن کانت أو کيف الحال فيها ثم أخذ في الكلام فيها فقال في رسمها أو حدَها. أَما أولاً فقال إنها تمام ما بالقوة وصورة، وأَما ثانية فقَال إِنها طريق من القوة إِلى الفعل …
The phraseology differs from the Greek. But especially for this reason, a part of the clause, “if [the movement] was”, إِن کانت, is noteworthy since it does not seem to help with the new phraseology. This can be the trace which we have been seeking of εἰ ἦν.[16]
2. J, Vind. phil. gr. 100: The “Wiener Aristoteles”
Favouring the variant reading of J for Phys. 250b13 raises the issue of assessing the authority of this manuscript in relation to the entire textual history of the Physics and of Aristotle’s physical works.
Dating from the 9th century, J antedates all other extant Aristotle’s manuscripts. It contains the entire corpus physicum – Physica (ff. 1r-55v), De caelo (56r-86r), De generatione et corruptione (86v-102r), Meteorologica (102v-134r) – as well as Theophrastus’ Metaphysics (134v-137r) and Aristotle’s Metaphysics (138r-201v, from 994a6 Bekker only).[17] Since it remained unknown until the late 19th century, there is no trace of J in printed editions before the 20th century. Even then, J has not been given stemmatic priority for any of the physical treatises it contains. Phys. VIII 1 thus offers a case study of Aristotelian philology which can be compared to that of the Metaphysics.[18]
Here as well, J, the oldest Aristotelian manuscript, offers unexplored novelties in its individual readings. The textual tradition of the passage does not especially support the narrative that Aristotle’s text was poorly preserved. His thoughts are shown to be sharp, undogmatic, expressed with exactitude and transmitted with care.
Appendix
Metaphysics Λ 6 and De caelo I 10: Two loci paralleli
Aristotle’s argument about the eternity of motion, as developed in Physics VIII 1, is a milestone in Aristotelian cosmology as a whole. On the one hand, it belongs to the broader context of Aristotle’s most contentious physical theory, the eternity of the world: in De caelo I 10, especially, the eternity of the world is argued for on the basis of the eternity of motion.[19] On the other hand, it plays a key role in his most hotly debated argument for the prime unmoved mover in Metaphysics Λ 6-7.[20]
Considering these two cross references might shed some light on the theoretical framework of the Phys. VIII 1 passage at issue.
As for the eternity of the world in De caelo I 10, this argument, as well as the one in Phys. VIII 1, is concerned with Presocratic and Platonic cosmogonies. De caelo I 10 provides a rich and informative parallel: Aristotle spells out the theoretical rationale for his way of arguing there and as well as in Phys. VIII 1.
In the framework of Aristotle’s notion of causality, cosmogonies imply the world to be generated and generable, thus depending on a previous cause, i.e., on a pre-existing motion. But nothing can pre-exist if the world does not exist.
In either case, from the failure of ancient cosmogonies to explain the world’s beginnings, Aristotle argues for the eternity of the universe.
By contrast, were the world born or created in time, as it appears to be both in Presocratic cosmogonies and in Plato’s Timaeus, it could not be eternal. Aristotle’s point is expressly directed against Plato’s Timaeus, insofar as this dialogue makes the world eternal only forward but not backward in time: it is only if the world was not born that it will also never perish.
This is also established in De caelo I 10, on the criterion stated at 279b20-23: the nature of beings shows up and applies to things always, or regularly at least. As Aristotle says:
[...] Generated things are always seen to be destroyed. On the other side, a thing whose present state had no beginning, one which could not have been other than it was at any previous moment throughout its entire duration, cannot possibly be changed.[21]
That is:
1. If something came to be in the past, it will eventually be destroyed (against the Timaeus cosmogony, which makes the cosmos eternal, though generated).
2. Most importantly for our present purpose: if something did not become or change in the past, it can in no way change in the future at all.
It follows that:
- non-eternal things must be generated,
- things which are generated – as Plato’s cosmos is according to a literal reading of the Timaeus – cannot be eternal,
- things which have not been generated must be eternal and cannot be corrupted. This implies that if the cosmos is not generated, there is no possibility that it could be destroyed.[22]
The argument concerns the nature of things in a broader sense. It includes the natural temporality of the world and of motion. Is the world eternal or perishable? It depends on its own nature. Is motion eternal or not? This depends on the motion’s own nature.[23]
The methodological key expressed in De caelo I 10 makes sense of the issue raised by Aristotle in Phys. VIII 1.250b11-14: whether movement (κίνησις) has had a beginning ([i] γέγονέ ποτε), or is non-generated in itself, in its own nature ([ii] ἢ οὔτ’ ἐγένετο).[24]
For if, and only if, motion had a beginning, will it also have an end. By contrast, if no previous theory about the beginning of movement proves to be sound, we can conclude that motion is eternal by its own nature ([iii] ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει, 250b13f.).
This implies – in terms of substance’s ontological priority over movement and affections – that the heavens, as an eternally moving subject, are also eternal.
This fits with Metaphysics Λ 6 as well. No doubt, once the if-reading in VIII 1.250b13 is accepted, the projection from past to future might especially affect the nature of Aristotle’s argument in Λ 6.
Previously in the same book, in the opening chapter of Λ, the focal meaning theory is restated. Hence, in chapter 6, the argument for the necessity of a prime unmoved mover is based, above all, on Physics VIII 1, where Aristotle argues that there was no time when motion did not exist.
This is expressed briefly, at Λ 6.1071b6-7, where the eternity of motion is recalled in a few distinctive words:
ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν, οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου·
But it is impossible that movement should either come into being or cease to be, for it <has been argued that it> always exists.[25]
Here Aristotle’s concise wording ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν (Λ 6.1071b7) summarizes the argument expressed in Physics VIII 1, where cosmic motion is argued to be indestructible and everlasting in the future: ἀεί is now coupled with ἦν. The imperfect tense ἦν also has a further value now: it refers to an argument which has been given in the past. [26] The argument is based on the hypothesis – the “if” hypothesis – of motion’s everlasting existence in the past. It is supplemented by an important remark: there was no time when time did not exist (ἀδύνατον … ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι … χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου, ibid. b7-9).
The Lambda sentence shows, and implies, that the movement’s eternity can be inferred if that movement had no beginning. This amounts to a good summary of the if argument in the newly found version of Physics VIII 1, which raises the issue at 250b12-13, as in Ms. J, Vind. phil gr. 100:
κίνησις … οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται.
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