Aristotelica

THE ANTISTHENEAN APORIA IN ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS H 3

2026-07-30T10:40:53+02:00

In Metaphysics H 3 (1043b4-32), Aristotle develops a unified account of definition that culminates in the so-called “Aporia of the Antistheneans.” This article offers a new interpretation of the role of that aporia within the overall argument of the chapter. It argues that Aristotle first criticizes two different conceptions of definition: on the one hand, materialist compositional theories, represented by the epistemological model known from Plato’s Theaetetus as the “Dream Theory”; on the other, certain Academic attempts to define substance through genus and differentia. According to Aristotle, both approaches ultimately fail to account for the unity of substance and, consequently, for the unity of its definition. Against this background, the introduction of the Aporia of the Antistheneans acquires a precise philosophical function. Rather than constituting an isolated digression or an independent refutation of Antisthenes, it serves as a dialectical step that exposes the limitations of a non-essentialist epistemology while preparing Aristotle’s own hylomorphic account of definition. A close analysis of the structure of the passage shows how the different philosophical positions brought into the discussion progressively converge toward Aristotle’s solution, according to which the unity of matter and form is the necessary condition of scientific definition. The article thus proposes an integrated reading of Metaphysics H 3 in which the Aporia of the Antistheneans is not an isolated textual difficulty but a central moment in Aristotle’s argumentative strategy for reformulating, through critical engagement, the principal theories of definition current in the philosophical debates of his time.

TIME AND SOUL: PHYSICS IV 14.223A21-29 IN NEOPLATONISM FROM PLOTINUS TO SIMPLICIUS

2026-07-30T10:44:45+02:00

This article examines the Neoplatonic reception of a few lines by Aristotle (Ph. 223a21-29) on the relationship between the soul and time. This reception begins with Plotinus, who engages critically in the debate between Boethus and Alexander. According to Treatise 45 (Enn. III 7), the Aristotelians do not adequately conceive of the links between the soul and time: the soul does not measure time, but generates it in a demiurgic manner, through its own movement of thought. Rejected by Plotinus, the Aristotelian notion of measurement is reinstated by Iamblichus: Aristotle’s error lies solely in failing to attribute ontological and demiurgic power to the soul and to its act of measuring time. Proclus goes even further in reinstating Aristotle: whilst criticising his lack of rigour (he does not move far enough up the chain of causes), he argues perfectly in Ph. 223a21-29. Proclus’s reception is essential, paving the way for Simplicius’s praise: in contrast to Iamblichus, he commends Aristotle for having elevated time beyond the sensible world, up to the soul. The Neoplatonic reception thus illustrates the complexity of the relationship with Aristotle among the Platonists of late antiquity: like Plato’s demon, he is both an indispensable authority and a limited thinker who must be put in his place. The conceptual challenge, then, is to place the Aristotelian account of time in the service of Timaeus 37c-d.

SIMPLICIUS ON ARISTOTLE’S PARADOX OF THE NOW

2026-07-30T10:48:25+02:00

This article analyzes Simplicius’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the now, a central issue for understanding Aristotle’s philosophy of time. It first examines Simplicius’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account in Physics IV and then his reassessment of the same problem in Physics VI. It argues that Simplicius’s interpretation is deeply informed by Neopythagorean thought, especially in his account of the sameness of the now, while at the same time showing that he remains, by and large, faithful to Aristotle by resisting the introduction of vertical differentiations or phases of the now. The article further shows that Simplicius’s interpretation exemplifies the distinctive philosophical profile of the ancient commentary tradition, in which exegesis and philosophical synthesis are inseparable. Finally, it identifies Simplicius’s assessment of Aristotle as a major source for influential modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of time, including both those that develop his reading and those that react against it from a more orthodox Peripatetic perspective.

ARISTOTLE AS THE BASIS OF NEOPLATONIC INSTRUCTION IN THE ARMENIAN TRADITION

2026-07-30T10:57:23+02:00

This article examines the role of Aristotle in the formation and development of the Neoplatonic educational system within the Armenian intellectual tradition from late Antiquity to the modern era. While Neoplatonism remained the dominant philosophical paradigm in Armenia for more than a millennium, Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy provided its indispensable propaedeutic foundation. Particular importance is attributed to David the Invincible, whose commentaries established Aristotelian logic as the preparatory stage of philosophical education and shaped the Armenian cursus studiorum for centuries. The article traces the development of this curriculum through medieval monastic schools and universities, highlighting the interaction of Greek, Syriac, Arabic, and Latin traditions and the continuous renewal of Aristotelian scholarship through translations, commentaries, and manuscript transmission. Special attention is devoted to Armenian and European manuscript collections, which testify to the central place of Aristotelian texts in Armenian intellectual life. Against the view that Aristotelian studies declined after the Middle Ages, the article argues for their continuity into the seventeenth-nineteenth centuries through new translations and printed logic handbooks. It concludes that Aristotle was not merely received in Armenia but functioned as a fundamental component of Neoplatonic education, shaping Armenian philosophy, theology, and scientific thought.

THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW WITNESS TO WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE’S TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE’S DE AN-IMALIBUS IN VERCELLI, MUSEO LEONE

2026-07-29T09:57:49+02:00

A hitherto neglected manuscript preserved in the Biblioteca del Museo Camillo Leone (Vercelli) contains William of Moerbeke’s translations of De animalibus, i.e., the Latin collection of Aristotle’s Historia animalium, De partibus animalium and De generatione animalium. Two colophons deserve particular attention. The first records the completion of the Historia animalium on 21 November 1260, a date previously unknown; the second confirms the already attested completion date of De partibus animalium (23 December 1260). This discovery prompted a closer examination of the manuscript, focusing on the text of the Historia animalium. The results suggest not only that the newly attested date deserves to be taken into account in reconstructing the chronology of Moerbeke’s translation, but also that the manuscript preserves an exceptionally valuable textual witness for the final chapters of Book X. The manuscript thus provides new evidence both for the chronology of Moerbeke’s translation and for the textual reconstruction of its concluding section.

IL LIBRO EPSILON DELLA METAPHYSICA NOVA ARABO-LATINA NELL’EDIZIONE APUD JUNCTAS (1562)

2026-07-30T11:11:00+02:00

The Giuntine edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1552; 1562), centred on the Arabic-to-Latin translation of Aristotle’s text together with Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum, became the most widely consulted printed version of this work during the Renaissance. The present article examines Book Epsilon as a specimen of the Metaphysica Nova, comparing the 1562 Giuntine text with the earliest manuscript, Paris, BnF, lat. 15453 (13th century), the authoritative Vatican manuscript, Vat. lat. 2080 (14th century), and the editio princeps printed by Laurentius Canozius (Padua, 1473). The Latin tradition is further compared with the principal Greek manuscripts – Vindobonensis Phil. gr. 100 (J, 9th century), Parisinus gr. 1853 (E, 10th century), and Laur. Plut. 87.12 (Ab, 12th century) – as well as with selected Arabic readings. The comparison shows that the Giuntine preserves a textual profile closely aligned with the earliest Latin tradition. No separative error within the Greek tradition has emerged that would require the Arabic-Latin tradition to stem from a different archetype. The evidence collected here so far supports the hypothetical reconstruction of a common archetype underlying both the Greek and the Arabic-Latin traditions.

POTENZA E ATTO. L’INFINITO IN ARISTOTELE E LEIBNIZ

2026-07-30T11:18:06+02:00

Leibniz articulates a peculiar conception of infinity, one that is simultaneously potential and actual. How can such a notion be coherent? This is possible insofar as the potential aspect corresponds to Aristotle’s notion of potential infinity (potentiality A), understood as processual or syncategorematic. The actual aspect, however, refers to a different kind of potentiality (potentiality L), which Leibniz attributes to the infinite in addition to potentiality A.

EDITORIAL

2026-07-30T10:33:27+02:00