PEDRO HURTADO DE MENDOZA (1578-1641) ON MATTER

Abstract

This paper examines a specific instance of conceptual and terminological reconfiguration in early modern scholastic Aristotelianism: the case of the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and his account of materia, tightly interwoven with the positions of fellow Jesuits Francisco Suárez and Rodrigo Arriaga. After reconstructing Hurtado’s position on the ontological status of prime matter, his rejection of the Aristotelian claim that it is pure potency, and his distinction between “physical” and “metaphysical” meanings of materia, we turn to Hurtado’s treatment of the matter-form relation. Hurtado maintains that matter and form’s being could, at least through divine power, be sustained separately. He likewise holds that matter can subsist without categorial quantity while preserving location and the capacity for local motion. We also address the problem of distinct kinds of matter and highlight Hurtado’s speculations concerning the possible existence of a hypothetical form of matter, a purely theoretical distinction that nonetheless remained relevant within early modern cosmological debates.