LEAST ATTRACTIVE?

Aristotelian Presuppositions to Explain Magnetic Movements

Abstract

Since Antiquity, scholars have sought to explain the cause of magnetic ‘attraction’ through diverse theories, which raised questions as to whether the magnet attracts iron or vice versa, or if both entities play equal roles. Aristotle himself avoided the notorious question of how magnetic attraction works: his commentators and critics made good for this lacuna. Medieval theories predominantly posited that iron moved towards the magnet for teleological reasons. Medical and alchemical authors in turn emphasized the magnet’s active attraction of iron, while only a minority believed in the iron’s active attraction of the stone. The seventeenth century saw William Gilbert establish an account of reciprocal attraction between the iron and the magnet. These causal representations, rather than being empirically grounded, were often rooted in natural-philosophical or metaphysical assumptions, especially Aristotle’s causal principle of motion. A fierce controversy about the ‘correct’ account of the causal roles in magnetic attraction grounded, prepared and partly overshadowed the debates on how to explain magnetism. This article will shed light on this little-known controversy. It offers a more balanced account of the tacit and salient impact of Aristotelian natural philosophy by providing a framework that enabled different theories to contradict each other – until even this framework dissolved during the seventeenth century.