THE ANTISTHENEAN APORIA IN ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS H 3

Abstract

In Metaphysics H 3 (1043b4-32), Aristotle develops a unified account of definition that culminates in the so-called “Aporia of the Antistheneans.” This article offers a new interpretation of the role of that aporia within the overall argument of the chapter. It argues that Aristotle first criticizes two different conceptions of definition: on the one hand, materialist compositional theories, represented by the epistemological model known from Plato’s Theaetetus as the “Dream Theory”; on the other, certain Academic attempts to define substance through genus and differentia. According to Aristotle, both approaches ultimately fail to account for the unity of substance and, consequently, for the unity of its definition. Against this background, the introduction of the Aporia of the Antistheneans acquires a precise philosophical function. Rather than constituting an isolated digression or an independent refutation of Antisthenes, it serves as a dialectical step that exposes the limitations of a non-essentialist epistemology while preparing Aristotle’s own hylomorphic account of definition. A close analysis of the structure of the passage shows how the different philosophical positions brought into the discussion progressively converge toward Aristotle’s solution, according to which the unity of matter and form is the necessary condition of scientific definition. The article thus proposes an integrated reading of Metaphysics H 3 in which the Aporia of the Antistheneans is not an isolated textual difficulty but a central moment in Aristotle’s argumentative strategy for reformulating, through critical engagement, the principal theories of definition current in the philosophical debates of his time.