TIME AND SOUL: PHYSICS IV 14.223A21-29 IN NEOPLATONISM FROM PLOTINUS TO SIMPLICIUS

Abstract

This article examines the Neoplatonic reception of a few lines by Aristotle (Ph. 223a21-29) on the relationship between the soul and time. This reception begins with Plotinus, who engages critically in the debate between Boethus and Alexander. According to Treatise 45 (Enn. III 7), the Aristotelians do not adequately conceive of the links between the soul and time: the soul does not measure time, but generates it in a demiurgic manner, through its own movement of thought. Rejected by Plotinus, the Aristotelian notion of measurement is reinstated by Iamblichus: Aristotle’s error lies solely in failing to attribute ontological and demiurgic power to the soul and to its act of measuring time. Proclus goes even further in reinstating Aristotle: whilst criticising his lack of rigour (he does not move far enough up the chain of causes), he argues perfectly in Ph. 223a21-29. Proclus’s reception is essential, paving the way for Simplicius’s praise: in contrast to Iamblichus, he commends Aristotle for having elevated time beyond the sensible world, up to the soul. The Neoplatonic reception thus illustrates the complexity of the relationship with Aristotle among the Platonists of late antiquity: like Plato’s demon, he is both an indispensable authority and a limited thinker who must be put in his place. The conceptual challenge, then, is to place the Aristotelian account of time in the service of Timaeus 37c-d.